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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T
of the

STATE OF UTAH

EMPLOYERS ~IUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.Civil No. 7733
ALLEN OIL COMPANY and KENNETH THORESEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

LA FORGE DAS-TRUP and FLORA
DAS-TRUP,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.Civil No. 7734

ALLEN OIL C·OMPANY and KENNETH THORE·SEN,
Defendants and Respondents.
S.TATEMENT OF FACTS
The above entitled cases were filed as separate actions in the District Court of Duchesne County, State of
Utah, but inasmuch as the injuries complained of in both
cases grew out of the same set of circumstances the cases
were combined for trial (TR 4-5).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Separate Notices of Appeal and separate Appeal
Bonds were filed, but an order has heretofore been enter~d consolidating the two cases before the Supreme Court
for hearing on appeal.
Of course, but one transcript has been prepared and
filed on appeal. However, the pleadings and proceedings
in the separate cases, up to the time of the trial in the
District Court, have been trans1nitted to the Supren1e
Court.
Wherever there are any differences in the positions
and rights of the plaintiffs Dastrup and the plaintiff Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company on this appeal, such differences will be pointed out, so that the
rights of the separate parties may be considered on their
merits by the appeal court where necessary or advisable.
Throughout this brief the parties will be referred to
as plaintiffs and defendants as they were in the trial
court.
In the action filed by the plaintiffs Dastrup, they
sought to recover damages against the defendant Allen
Oil Company and one of its truck drivers, Kenneth
T-=horesen, for the destruction of the plaintiffs' gasoline
station and store at Altamont in Duchesne County, Utah,
admittedly resulting from a gasoline fire and explosion
which occurred on August 2·3rd, 1946, while the defendant Allen Oil Company through its agent, the defendant
Thoresen, was making a delivery of gasoline to the Dastrup premises.
2
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.A.t the tilne of the fire and explosion, one Dean Cox
had just driYen into the Dastrup service station with a
pick-up truck belonging to the l\Ioon Lake Electric Company. ..A.s a result of the fire and explosion, the Moon
Lake truck "~as practically den1olished, and Mr. Cox received certain physical injuries. The plaintiff Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Company carried the insurance on the truck and also industrial compensation insurance covering 1\lr. Cox's employer and Mr. Cox as an
employee. ....\..dmittedly, the plaintiff Insurance Company
paid for the damages to the truck and also paid industrial compensation to 1\Ir. Cox for his injuries, as well as
for medical care and hospitalization. The Insurance
Company's action is for reimbursement for the amounts
paid on the claims presented against that company based
on the insurance coverage hereinbefore mentioned.
The evidence is uncontroverted to the effect that
on the 23rd day of August, 1946, the plaintiffs Dastrup
owned and operated a general store, together with a gasoline sevice station, at Altamont, a rather remote sn1all
settlement about 30 miles to the north of the to,vn of
Duchesne, in Duchesne County, Utah. For some time
prior to August 23rd, 1946, the Dastrups had purchased
petroleum products, including gasoline, from the defendant Allen Oil Company (TR 119). On August 23rd, 1946,
which was a clear, hot day, the defendant Kenneth Thoresen drove a large gasoline tanker loaded with gasoline
from Salt Lake City to Altamont to be delivered to the
Dastrup gasoline tanks at their service station, immediately in front of their store, pursuant to an order received by the Allen Oil Company from Mr. Dastrup.
3
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The defendant Thoresen arrived at the Dastrup
premises some time about mid-afternoon on the day in
question. He was warned upon his arrival by Mrs. Dastrup that the center of the three gasoline tanks owned by
the Dastrups was slightly tilted, and that he was to be
sure not to fill it completely (TR 169; 408). The plaintiffs' evidence clearly shows that the defendant Thoresen, the agent of the Allen Oil Company, put a metal
nozzle into a metal intake running into the center tank on
the Dastrup premises in a negligent manner; that he
thereupon turned a large flow of gasoline from the tanker through a hose to which the nozzle was attached, and
then went into the store and left the gasoline· flowing un~
attended ( TR 153-52; 409) ; that while he was gone a
large quantity of gasoline overflowed from the fill-pipe
and nozzle onto the surrounding pavement as well as onto the island where the pumps were located, and that
Neal Dastrup, a S'On of the· plaintiffs Dastrup, called to
Thoresen, who was. in the store, and told hin1 that the
gasoline was overflowing (TR 154). Thoresen then ran
out of the store and started to turn off the gasoline flowing through the hose. About the time he· got the gasoline
·shut off and the hose uncoupled from the truck, and while
the truck was still standing by the pumps a fire and explosion occurred ( TR 400; 155-56) which destroyed the
Dastrup gasoline station, their store with all of their
stock of goods and equipment, and p·ut them out of busi~
ness for a considerable period of time. The Moon Lake
truck driven by Cox was damaged and Cox was injured.

4
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The plaintiffs contend that the fire and explosion
resulted fro1u the cre~tion of an explosive medium of air
and gasoline vapor resulting from the negligent spilling
of gasoline on the hot pavement and around the pumps,
,vhich explosive medium was ignited by a spark caused
through so1ne of the manipulations of Thoresen in handling the hose in the fill-pipe, by dropping a wrench or
coupling upon the gravel, through static electricity discharged from the truck, by walking upon the surrounding
pavement or gravel, or by some other act for which the
plaintiffs were not responsible. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs were negligent in the construction
and maintenance of their gasoline storage facilities.
The jury brought in a verdict in each case for the
defendants, and each of them, and against the plaintiffs,
and each of them, "No cause for action." Separate motions were made in the two cases for new trials. The
motions were denied.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the court
erred in his rulings on the admission and exclusion of
evidence, as well as in his refusal to give certain requested instructions, and in the giving of certain erroneous
instructions, and in denying plaintiffs' motions for a new
trial.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON F'OR
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT
The points relied upon by the appellants for reversal
of the verdict and judgment of the lower court are as follows:

5
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POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LANGFORD TO TESTIFY THAT THE
INSTALLATION OF THE FACILITIES ON THE DASTRUP
PREMISES FOR THE STORAGE OF GASOLINE DID NOT
CONFORM TO SAFE PRACTICES.

POINT NO. II.
THE C·O,URT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF 0. C. AL.L.EN, PRESIDENT OF THE DEFENDANT ALLEN OIL· c·oMPANY (TR. 582, 583, 585, 586).

POINT NO. III.
THE COURT ERRED IN IT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE
THE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6
AND 7.

POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTR.UCTIONS NUMBER 13 AND 14 BECAUSE THE SAID INSTRUC·TIONS 'VERE MIS.LEADING, CONFUSING, INCOMPLETE AND AN ERRO·NEOUS STATEMENT OF
THE L.AW.

POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16 BECAUSE UNDER THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS WERE
GUIL.TY OF NEG-LIGENCE.

POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTION NUMB~ER 18.

POINT NO. VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 19.
6
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POINT NO. VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INS.TR.UCTION
NO. 22.

POINT NO. IX.
AS TO THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS MUTUAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMP'ANY IN CASE NO·. 7734,
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NO. 23 DIREC'I:'ING THE JURY TO FTND THE ISSUES
AGAINST THE SAID P'LAINTIFF IF IT FOUND THAT
DEAN COX, DRIVER OF THE MO·ON LAKE TRUCK,
WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

POINT NO. X.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PL,AINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THE CASE OF
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY COMPANY.

POINT NO. XI.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S DASTRUP FOR NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LANGFORD TO TESTIFY THAT THE
INSTALLATION OF THE FACILITIES ON THE DASTRUP
PREMISES FOR THE STORAGE OF GASOLINE DID NOT
CONFORM TO SAFE PRACTICES.

One y··. C. Langford was called as a witness for the
defendants. This witness \vas asked by counsel for Allen
Oil Company, after counsel had p-ropounded a long
hypothetical question, to state his conclusion concerning
the situation on D~astrups' property. Defendants' counsel asked this question:

7
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"Now I ask you, in your experience, if that
set-up that I have described to you was a place
for the storage of gasoline which did comply with
safe practices in the oil industry~"
Objection was made to the question. The court
pointed out that perhaps there were some items included
in the question upon which there wasn't sufficient evidence, but that such evidence could be offered later.
Counsel for plaintiffs, however, insisted upon the objection that Mr. Langford was not qualified to answer the
question, and "also that he (counsel) is asking for an
ultimate statement of fact which is invading the province
of the jury." The court overruled both objections.
Counsel ror plaintiffs then insisted upon the answer
in these words:
"Just state whether it does or does not conform to safe practices.
A.

It does not."

Very clearly the witness was testifying as to an
ultimate fact. Furthermore, he was not qualified to
answer.
Under no circumstances can a witness state as an
ultimate fact that which a jury is selected to deter1nine.
The witness Langford stated clearly that the situation
presented to him, which was not an accurate presentation
of the facts, was not safe.
POINT NO. II.
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF 0. C. ALLEN, PRESIDENT OF THE DEFENDANT ALLEN OIL COMPANY (TR. 582, 583, 585, 586).

8
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The plaintiff8 called as a rebuttal vvitness 0. C.
Allen, \vho \Vas president of the defenda:r:tt Allen Oil
Company on August :23, 1946, when the fire and Hxplosion
complained of occurred (Tr. 582).
After ~Ir. Allen had testified that he was subpoenaed
by the defendants, and that he was the president of the
Allen Oil Company on August 23, 1946, he was asked
the following question:

Q. nlr. Allen, directing your attention to the fact
that on the LaForge Dastrup· premises in
Altamont there were certain tanks, gasoline
storage tanks, installed in an underground,
unfilled chamber. Did you know of that condition on and prior to August 23, 1946 f'
(Tr. 582).
Thereupon the following pToceedings occurred:
"MR. RICE:

Just a minute.

"MR. YOUNG: On behalf of the defendant
Thoresen we object to that.
"THE COURT:

On what ground?

"1fR. YOUNG: On the ground it is irnmaterial and incompetent-any knowledge upon him
can't be binding upon this defendant as an individual. They're suing this man as an individual,
your Honor.
"THE COURT : I wonder if this question
of knowledge has anything to do with what we
have before us.
"MR. RICE: I object to it on the ground
that it is immaterial and irrelevant, your Honor.
"THE COURT: The objection will be sustained." ( Tr. 582-583).
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The plaintiffs then made the following offer out
of the presence of the jury:
"MR. WILSON: If your Honor please,
come now the plaintiffs and hereby offer to produce to the court and jury, through the witness
0. C. Allen, who was just sworn, testimony to
this effect: that while he was president of the
Allen Oil Company, as he testified, and prior
to August 23, 1946, he learned of the installation
of the tanks in the underground chamber as
testified to in this case, and of the general installations connected therevvi th, and that he was
aware of such conditions through information
he had, on the 23rd day of August, 1946, when
the delivery of gasoline vvas made to the plaintiffs Dastrup, as has been testified to in this
record; and that particularly the president of
the Allen Oil Company knew that the tanks on
the Dastrup premises to which gasoline was delivered by the Allen Oil Company were installed
in an underground, open chamber on August
23, 1946, at the time of the delivery of the gasoline
in question.
"MR. RIC·E:
go to the offer.

I suppose our objection would

"THE COURT: This is just making the
offer. You objected to it and the court sustained
the objection.
"MR. WILSON:
"THE COURT:
585-586).

That is the offer.
That is all of that." (Tr.

The only point urged by the court in his menlorandum denying the motion for new trials (Tr. 798, et seq.)
in support of sustaining the objection to the offer of

10
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the ..t\.llen testimony '"·as that it \vas part of the plaintiffs'
case in chief, and should have been offered a.s part of
the plaintiffs' main case. It is very evident, however,
fron1 the court's 1nemorandum that his reasons are an
afterthought, because the record of the trial shows very
clearly that counsel for the; defendant as well as the
court did not have in 1nind that the evidence wa.s out of
order, but that it 'vas immaterial and irrelevant. Now,
obviously testimony if offered out of order isn't necessarily irrelevant and immaterial. Furthermore, the purpose of the trial is to get all the facts. Rule 1 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the said
rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Rule 43 lT.C.P. provides that "all evidence shall be
admitted which is admissible under the statutes of this
state or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
to the courts in this state. In any case, the statute or
rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs,
and the evidence shall be p,resented according to the
most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes
or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in
like manner."
The court 1n his memorandum also states, "The
argument made in plaintiffs' brief that the offered testimony was rebuttal of the defense of contributory negligence would have great merit if it weren't for the fact
that plaintiffs relied upon the faulty construction of
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the tanks, and defendants' knowledge thereof, as establishing the high degree of care required of the defend~
ants, in their delivery of gasoline, (Tr. 800).
Again the court had forgotten the situation, because
the plaintiffs relied only upon the fact that one tank
was tilted, and placed no reliance whatever on the question of the installation of the tanks in an open chamber
or the installation of the electric compressor motor in
an adjoining room. The evidence shovvs that plaintiffs
Dastrup thought their installations were properly made
and maintained.
Leland Stephensen, a licensed plumber and building
contractor, testified that the tanks, the vents and the
connections for putting the gas into the tanks and removing it therefrom were properly made (Tr. 143-144).
Drew Allred, a witness called on behalf of the defendants, testified that he installed the electric colnpressor and that the: installation was properly made (Tr.
83).
La Forge Dastrup, one of the plaintiffs, testified
as follows:

"Q.

Had you on various occasions gone from the
small basement room into the place where
the storage tanks were kept~
"A. Yes, sir. I check that on every load.
"Q. Had you been into that room to make an
inspection prior to the 23rd of August, 19461
"A. y es.
"Q. How long before the 23rd of August, 1946,
was it that you made your last inspection
in that room~
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".A.. I'd say t\\·o \Yeeks, possibly threP.
'' Q. From the time you made your inspecti<!>n in
that room had there been any delivery of
gasoline to your premises prior to the gasoline delivery on August 23, 1946~
HA.

Yes, sir.

•'Q.

Had there been any prior to that time, prior
to the tin1e-after the time of your inspection
and prior to this other inspection~

··A.

No, sir.

~·Q.

N O\V when you went in and made your inspection prior to August 23, 1946, will you statEt
if anything what you found.

~-A.

"'Q.

Well, I had these tanks all painted up nice
and I observed that they were in good condition.
\\Tere any of them leaking~

"A.

N o, s1r.
.

~'Q.

Did you find any indication of gas leaking
into that basement room~

·•A.

No, sir." (Tr. 2'1-22).

The defendants really based their whole defense
on the ground that the plaintiffs, and each of them,
were guilty of contributory negligence. The contributory
negligence complained of, or at least which the defendants sought to prove, was entirely on the part of the
plaintiffs Dastrup. The alleged contributory negligence
consisted of the claim that the installation of the underground tanks in an open room or ·chamber and the maintenance of the electric compressor engine were negligent.
Defendants' first witness was Drew Allred who testified
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that he installed the electric engine in question. Mr.
Allred. state·d that all the installations he made were
properly made (Tr. 83), according to prescribed regulations; that no electricity at all could pass through the
motor unless it was in operation, and that it didn't operate unless the air pressure went down, and then the
motor started automatically (Tr. 83 and 84).
The next witness was one V. C. Langford. He testified that the installations around the Da.strup premises
were unsafe. He was asked, "Now I ask you, in your
experience, if that set-up that I have described to you
as a place for the storage of gasoline, would it comply
with safe practice in the oil industry~"
To which Mr. Langford replied, "No, it doesn't."
(Tr. 352-357).
The other witnesses testified to substantially the
S'ame effect. In other words, the defense was that plaintiffs Dastrup were negligent in maintaining tanks in an
unfilled, underground chambeT.
It was, therefore, very proper rebuttal to show that
the defendants who were making the gasoline delivery
at fue time the fire and explosion occurred, had, for
some time prior to the date of the injuries complained
of, known of the manner in which the Dastrup tanks
were installed and maintained, and notwithstanding said
fact made their deliveries. Furthermore, the undisputed
testimony showed that two of the pumps and two of the
three storage tanks installed and in use on the Dastrup
property on August 23, 1946, were owned by the defendant Allen Oil Company (Tr. 42, line 27).
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In his 1nen1orandun1 in ~upport of his ruling ag·ainst
the motion for ne"· trial the Judge stated, "The testirnony of defendant Thoresen established that he was
n1aking his first delivery to plaintiffs' tanks when the
explosion occurred." The court is in error in n1aking
such an inadvertent staten1ent. Thoresen didn't testify
as to 'vhether he had n1ade any previous deliveries or
not. He stated that he did make one later delivery
(Tr. 407-408). However, there was testimony by plaintiffs~ 'vitnesses that Thoresen had made at least one
previous delivery ( Tr. 96). Furthermore, the testimony
shows numerous deliveries of great quantities of gasoline
to Dastrups by Allen Oil Company before August 23,
1946 ( Tr. 19, lines 22-27).
The position taken by the trial Judge in his memorandum is untenable when viewed in light of the record
made at the trial.
\Ve contend, of course, that the testin1ony was
proper rebuttal, since both defendants relied aln1ost
entirely for their defense upon the alleged negligence
of Mr. and nfrs. Dastrup in constructing and maintaining an underground chamber with an electric engine
in an adjoining room. Practically all their witnesses
testified concerning the fact that failure to fill in with
earth or other material the space in the underground
chamber around the gasoline storage tanks was bad
practice, and the principal witnesses for the defendants
testified that the maintenance of the electric engine near
the unfilled underground chamber was the essential
element that brought about the explosion and fire. ~fr.
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Allen's testimony \vas offered for the purpose of showing
that, as President of the Allen Oil Company, he knew
the way in which the tanks for the storage of gasoline
were constructed and maintained. Surely, the jury was
entitled to know, through Mr. Allen's testimony, that
the defendant corporation knew of the existing conditions. The jury was entitled to deter1nine whether that
fact had any bearing on the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
The two expert witnesses (Dr. ~Ielvin A. Cook and
Dr. Loren Bryner) called by the defendants to explain
the fire and explosion testified that the maintenance of
the electric engine near the unfilled underground storage
chamber was in their opinion the essential elen1ent that
brought about the explosion and fire (Tr. 510, line 18).
Mr. Allen's testimony was offered for the purpose
of showing that as president of the Allen Oil Company
he knew, and therefore the defendant Allen Oil Company knew, the manner in which the gasoline storage
tanks and compressor on the Dastrup premises 'vere
installed and maintained; that he knew and, therefore,
the defendant company kne\v of all the conditions on the
Dastrup premises testified to by defendants' wi h1esses
a.s constituting contributory negligence; and notwithstanding that knowledge this oil company, whose business it was to deal in the distribution of gasoline, made
the delivery. Surely the jury was entitled to determine
whether those facts had any bearing on the alleged
negligence of the defendants, and on the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. By excluding
tllat evidence the court deprived the plaintiffs of pre-
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senting a very in1portant aspect of their case and deprived the jury of learning the full facts and circunlstances covering the rights of the parties.

Peterson vs. Betts (\Vashington), 165 Pac. 2nd 95,
was a case in 'vhich the evidence showed that the defendants making the gasoline delivery to premises which
were allegedly maintained in an unsafe condition had
no knowledge concerning the manner in which the gasoline tanks and connections were maintained on the
premises to which the delivery was made.
The court held th·at although there is no duty resting
upon one who delivers gasoline in bulk to a purchaser
on the latter's premises to inspect the purchaser's storage facilities to determine whether such facilities are
safe, yet the court quoted with approval the following
rule laid down in Allegretti vs. Murphy-Miles Oil Company (Illinois), N.E. 2nd 389 at 391:
~'The

rule is, that where one furnishing bulk
products does not install the receptacle for those
products or the piping connecting such receptacle
with the source of sup·ply necessary to fill them,
and does not own or have control over them, he
is not responsible for the condition of their maintenance, and cannot be held liable for injuries
caused by an accident arising out of a defective
condition in such receptacle or its equipment,
in the absence of knowledge of such defect."
It would seem to follow, therefore, th·at liability
would attach if a company making such deliveries had
knowledge of the defects.

17
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We are not, of course, conceding that there was any
negligence on the part of the Dastrups in the manner
in which they installed and maintained their facilities
for the recepton and distribution of gasoline delivered
by the Allen Oil Company, but we do contend that if
it was proper to admit evidence of the installation and
maintenance of the Dastrup storage tanks in an unfilled
underground chamber, and of the electric compressor
engine in an adjoining room, and that if the jury as instructed by the court could find that the Dastrup installations were defective and unsafe, then surely no testimony that was offered in the entire case was Inore pertinent and entitled to greater weight than the testimony
which the plaintiffs offered to produce through the president of the Allen Oil Company that the defendant knew
of all those conditions and yet made delivery of gasoline
as though the Dastrup installations had met e-very possible prescribed standard.
The evidence is unusually important in view of the
fact that with the knowledge of the existence of the
unfilled, underground chamber, the Allen Oil Company
permitted gasoline to overflow in such a manner that
it could evaporate and form an explosive medium with
air in the said chamber, ·and an inflammable medium
around the pumps, and so manipulated the delivery
facilities under the full control of the said Allen Oil
Company and its agent that a spark was created to ignite
the explosive or inflammable medium created through
the negligence of the Allen Oil Company.
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A reading of the Peter:)vn case (~upra) clearly
reveals that the court considered the question of the
knowledge of the defendant making the delivery concerning the condition of the premises to which the delivery was being made, a deciding factor in determining
the question of negligence.

In the case of Loverde vs. Consumer's Petroleum
Comparny (Illinois), 63 N.E. 2nd 673, the court held

that an "oil company, through its agents, owed duty to
use ordinary care in the delivery of oil and the company's agents were bound to use caution commensurate
with known danger."
That case again clearly indicates that the court
placed great emphasis on the question of the. knowledge
of the persons making. the delivery of explosive substances concerning the conditions existing where the
deliveries 'vere made.
It was highly important to the· plaintiffs that the
knowledge of the defendants concerning the conditions
on the Dastrup premises be made known to the jury.
Such evidence might well have been the turning point
in the case.
Even though the evidence offered through the witness Allen, could in any manner be construed as having
been offered out of order, no objections were made to
it upon that ground. Had such an objection been made,
it would have been an easy matter for plaintiffs to have
asked leave of court to offer the evidence as part of
their case in chief.
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"The fact that the matter could have been offered
1n chief, does not preclude its admission in rebuttal."
French vs. Hall, 119 U.S. 152; St. Paul Plow Works vs.
Starling, 140 U.S. 184; Throckmorton vs. Holt, 180 U.S.
552; Lewis vs. Tappen, 45 Alt. 459, 47 L.R.A. 385.
POINT NO. III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE THE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6 AND 7.

In Instruction Number 6 (Tr. 'i-09) the plaintiffs
requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:
"If you find that the plaintiffs Dastrup constructed and maintained their premises in such
a manner as to constitute a fire hazard, such
fact or facts may or may not constitute contributory negligence. And if you find that a person
knowing the condition of the premises and notwithstanding said knowledge acted neglig~ntly,
the proximate result of which caused injury to
plaintiffs, then you may find in favor of plaintiffs
and against the person having said knowledge."
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 7 (Tr. 709)
reads as follows :
"If you find that the plaintiffs Dastrup constructed and maintained their premises in such
a manner as to constitute· a fire hazard such fact
or facts may or may not constitute contributory
20
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negligenee. There i8 no evidence that any act of
the plaintiffs in this case was unlawful and the
la'v allo"'"S a person to make any lawful use of
his property he deems best. Furthermore the
la'v does not require a person to anticipate the
negligent acts of another."
The eourt refused to give either of these instructions
and the plaintiffs objected to the court's refusal in the
following 'vords:
"Objects to the court's failure to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 6, particularlyin general, a~d particularly for the reason that
in failing to give said instruction the court has
refused to instruet on plaintiffs' theory of the
case'' (Tr. 591). Similar exception was taken to
No.7.
There was no state law, nor any other public regulation o£ any kind whatsoever, prohibiting the plaintiffs
Dastrup fro1n constructing and maintaining their gasoline tanks, electric engine and pumps as they were
installed and maintained. The use which the Dastrups
made of their premises was a perfectly legal use. It
was not a situation such as existed in the large-r cities
of Utah where there were certain fire restrictions and
other restrictions embodied in city ordinances. It was,
therefore, error not to instruct the jury that the use
which the Dastrups were making of their property at
the time of the :fire and explosion in question was a legal
and proper use, violating no law or other public regulations of any type.
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As pointed out in the case of J. J. Mayou llfanufacturilng Compawy vs. Consumers Oil and Refining Company (Wyoming), 146 P. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243, "The
mere fact that one may have a fire hazard on his premises, which he uses lawfully, does not amount to contributory negligence as a matter of law, so as to bar
recovery by reason of the negligence of another in causing the fire and destroying the premises."
The same case further points out that, "One is
not bound to anticipate the negligent acts of another, and
to expose oneself or his property to danger is not necessarily contributory negligence; such negligence does
not automatically_ arise merely because an accident might
have been avoided."
We are not suggesting that the court instructed
that the Da.strups were guilty of negligence as a matter
of law. However, we do have in mind that it was highly
prejudicial to the plaintiffs when the court refused to
instruct that the use which the Dastrups made of their
premises, and the method of the installation and maintenance of their gas equipment, were perfectly lawful.
Such an instruction was of great importance to the plaintiffs in view of the fact that practically all of the defendants' witnesses operated in areas covered by city ordinances and fire regulations making restrictions against
the use of premises in the city in the manner in which
the Dastrups used their equipment in Duchesne County.
The requested Instructions 6 and 7 are fully supported by the law as set forth in the Wyoming case, 146
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Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243. That case reviews numerous other cases and is followed by an exhaustive note
beginning on page 1261 A.L.R.
In the instant case the trial court seemed to feel
that he had to keep a'vay from the jury any affirmative
suggestion that what the plaintiffs Dastrup did on their
premises didn't necessarily deprive them of their right
to recover. But he went all out in instructing that what
the plaintiffs did might well deprive them of their right
to recover. For exan1ple, see Instructions 13 ( Tr. 759),
14 (Tr. 759-60), 16 (Tr. 761), 17 (Tr. 726), 18 (Tr. 762),
19 (Tr. 763), 20 (Tr. 763), 21 (Tr. 764), 22 (Tr. 764),
and 23 (Tr. 764). See Johnson vs. Lewis Stages (Ut.) 240
p 2 498.
We are not in the least suggesting any bad faith
on the part of the court. The Judge presided over the
trial with great dignity and fairness. However, certain
things occurred during the trial which made him extremely technical in his rulings against the plaintiffs.
Upon complaint of counsel for the defendants (Tr. 288),
the court called in one of the jurors, l\fr. Defa, and
advised him that there had been complaints made of the
misconduct of the jurors and the Judge proceeded to
examine Mr. Defa concerning his conduct (Tr. 360-363).
From the statement made by 1\fr. Rice (Tr. 366)
concerning the misconduct of the jury, it will be observed
that a doctor residing in the community, who was not
on the jury, was called in and examined by the court
upon the representation of counsel for the defendants
that the doctor had been talking to one or more of the
JUrors.
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From the whole situation it will be seen that a feeling of extreme caution unconsciously developed on the
court's part in instructing concerning the liability of the
defendants, while all instructions requested for the
plaintiff which stated the plaintiffs' theory of the case
were refused.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTIONS
NUMBER 13 AND 14 BECAUSE THE SAID INSTRUCTIONS
WERE MISLEADING, CONFUSING, INCOMPLETE AND
AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF THE LAW.

In Instruction Number 13 (Tr. 75'9) the court
charged the jury :
"That a person injured by the negligence of
another person cannot recover damages against
such other person if the one seeking judgment
against the other was himself negligent, and his
negligence contributed in any degree, however
slight, to produce his own injury and damage.
This is what has been referred to in these instructions as contributory negligence. Thus is in this
case, if you find that at the time and place alleged
in plaintiffs' complaint the defendants were negligent in one or more particulars therein set forth,
but if you also find that the plaintiffs were themselves negligent in the manner of construction
and maintenance of their underground tanks,
or in the installation or upkeep of their compressor upon their premises, or in their manner of
storing gasoline, or their maintenance of their
pumps, or their electric wiring, or the piping
in connection -with their tanks or pumps, and
that such negligence proximately contributed in
any degree, to produce plaintiffs' damage, then

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

your verdiet 1nust be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, no cause for action."
(Tr. 759). Exception 'vas taken to this instruction ( Tr. 593).
Surely it cannot be rontended that there is any definition of negligence or contributory negligence in that
instruction, because there was no criterion given to the
jury by which to determine what constituted negligence
on the part of the plaintiffs Dastrup in the construction
and n1aintenance of the gasoline storage facilities upon
their premises. Was such ne~ligence· to be dete:rmined
by the practice§ and customs followed in the area (Altamont, a remote, small community in Duchesne County);
by the ordinances in effect in Salt Lake City as testified
to by defendants' witnesses; by what ordinarily. careful
persons would have done under similar circumstances;
or i~ som~ <;>~~er wanl}.er ~ The jurors were given no
guide wp~tever by which to measure what constituted
contributory negligence or what constituted care or want
of care under the circumstances of this case.
Instruction Number 14 gives some additional
rial, but finally winds up by saying:

r~:a te-

"* * * and if you further find that such negligence proximately contributed to produce their
own damages as defined and set forth in Instruction Number 13 above, then you must find in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs."
In other words, the court referred the jury back to
Instruction Number 13 for his definition of contributory
negligence (Tr. 760). The plaintiff excepted to the giving
of Instructions Number 13 and 14 (Tr. 593).
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The court nowhere, except in Instruction Nu1nber
13, attempted to define contributory negligence, and in
that instruction completely failed to outline to the jury
that contribuory negligence must contain the same elements as negligence, and to give any standards for determining what constituted due care or want of care.
This instruction is subject to the same criticism as
the charge given in the case of Johnson vs. Lewis, 240
Pacific 2nd 498, in which the Utah Suprerue Court said:
"Nowhere in the instruction 'vas the jury told
that negligence is a necessary element of contributory negligence. Of course, negligence is a
necessary element of contributory negligence and
the jury should be so instructed."
The court in the Johnson case further stated:
"The phrase, 'which in any martner, however
slight', is probably technically correct and would
do no harm if the jury, in spite of it, keep in
mind that there must be a negligent act, that is,
an act which lacks ordinary care; and that such
act must proximately contribute to cause the
injury, that is, it must, as a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new or intervening cause produce the injury complained of.
But it see1ns hard to reconcile an act which has
those causal qualities as being one whi'ch 'in any
manner, however slight', causes or even proximately contributes to cause the injury. In other
words, it seems that in order for an act to constitute negligence and proximately contribute to
the causing of an injury it would have to be an
effective cause thereof and not merely a slight
cause of such injury. This phrase is calculated
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to belittle thl• eausal relationship necessary bet,\Teen the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
and the accident and tends to induce the jury to
forget that such contributory negligence: must
be the result of a negligent act and a contributing
proximate cause of the injury, and, therefore,
tends to confuse rather than enlighten the jury
on that problem.
"This tendency would not be so objectionable
if the same type of phrase were used in describing the causal relationship required between the
defendants' negligence and the accident or injury.
But no such phrase was used in instructing on
defendants' negligence."
An analysis of Instructions No. 13 and 14 show that

no understandable definition of contributory negligence
for the guidance of the jury was given in those instructions. Such instructions were clearly erroneous under
the Johnson case (240 Pac. 2nd 498) sup-ra.
The instant cases we-re of such nature that they
called for accurate unambiguous statements of the law
for the guidance of the jury.
In the case of Loverde et al. vs. Consumers Petroleum Company (Illinois), 63 Northeastern 2nd 673, the
court stated that:
"Where a case is close on the facts the issues
involved therein must be determined upon conflicting evidence, the jury must be accurately
instructed."
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POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16 BECAUSE UNDER THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

In Instruction Number 16 the court instructed the
jury as follows:
"You are further instructed that if you find
from the evidence in this case, that the defendants did those things that an ordinary prudent
person would have done under si1nilar circun1stances, I charge you that they were not guilty
of negligence and your verdict must be against
the: plaintiffs, and both of them, and for the
defendants." (Tr. 761).
The plaintiffs duly excepted to the giving of that
instruction in the following words:
"Objects to the court's giving Instruction
Number 16 and the whole thereof.
"Objects to the court's giving Instruction
Number 17, and the whole thereof, on the grounds
and for the reasons that said instruction is not
supported by, and is contrary to the law and the
eytdence.
"May I make the same statement of reason
for my objection to Instruction Number 16~ May
the record so show, your Honor~
"THE C·OURT: It may so show." (Tr. 594).
The record is such that Instruction Number 16
could not help but mislead the jury. The defendant
Thoresen, who was also admittedly the agent of the
defendant Allen Oil Company, testified as follows under
cross-examination:
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•'Q. _.A.t any ti1ne ,,·hile gas \Vas flo\ving into any
of those tanks did you leave the hose running
and go into the store~

''Q.

I \\'"ent in for-

"Q.

_A_ns\ver that, will you

H.;;.\.

Yes.

·~Q.

please~

While gas was running from your
"A. y es, s1r.
.

truck~

''Q.

Did you leave a hose unattended and go into
the store~

··A.

Yes, sir." (Tr. 409).

Measured by any standard, surely an ordinarily
prudent person wouldn't leave a truck unattended, from
which such a dangerous substance as gasoline is flowing
in large quantities through a hose into an intake such
as the one described in this case. That such an act was
in and of itself sufficient to cause the damages complained of, is not contended, but that it was an act of
negligence, and the negligent act which started the chain
of circumstances that caused plaintiffs' damages is clear.
Under the Court's Instruction Number 16, the jury could
have assumed that such an act was not negligent, and
was the conduct of a prudent, careful person.
"Clearly, it is negligence in one delivering
fuel oil to overflow the receiving tank through
inattention to the amount of fuel being delivered."
151 A.L.R. 1270, note (e), citing J. J. May our
Mfg. Company vs. c·onsumers Oil Comp·any, 146
P. (2) 738.
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In Nolan et al. vs. Hasket (Ark.), 53 Southwestern
2nd 996, it was held that leaving gasoline flowing through
a hose from a gasoline truck into the intake of a storage
tank unattended is negligence.
Furthermore, the testimony of the· defendant Thoresen clearly shows that there was no gauge or check on
the Allen Oil truck or on the hose to limit the amount of
gas which could flow through or to measure the amount
of gasoline passing from the gasoline tanker in to the
storage tank. Only by listening to the sounds in the
intake pipe and by watching the hose could the attendant
tell when the storage tank was full (Tr. 413).
Yet the defendant Thoresen, agent of the defendant
Oil Company, freely admitted that he left the gasoline
flowing unattended and went into the store (Tr. 409).
The defendant Thoresen also admitted that he left
plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, and C at the scene of the fire
and explosion (Tr. 410-11). The hose nozzle, Exhibit A,
according to the undisputed testimony, was found in the
intake to the fill-pipe of the center gasoline storage tank
after the fire (Tr. 26; 194). Exhibits B and C were also
at the place of the fire. It is, therefore, indisputable
that Thoresen dropped Exhibits B and C.
POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 18.

In Instruction Number 18 the court instructed the
jury on the theory that the fire and explosion might
be found to have been an unavoidable accident, and went
on to charge :
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~~\\~hen

all parties concerned in the happening
of an accident have done, and at the time of the
accident, are doing those acts, and only those
acts, 'vhich a reasonable and p·rudent person
under all of the facts and circumstances shown
by the evidence, "'"ould do, and are doing such
acts with the care and caution which ordinary
and prudent persons, having due· regard for their
own safety and the safety of others would use,
and in spite of such care and prudence of the
parties the accident occurs, then no person is
responsible to the other person for the happening
of the accident or for any damages resulting
therefrom. Where no negligence of any party is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the
law simply requires the parties injured to bear
their own loss. Thus, in order to hold the defendants for the damages sought by the plaintiffs in
this case, you must find the defendants negligent
in some particular alleged in the Complaint, that
such negligence was the proximate cause of their
da1nage, and that plaintiffs were not guilty of
contributory negligence as herein defined." (Tr.
762).
The plaintiffs excepted to that instruction and the
whole thereof "on the grounds and for the reasons that
such instruction is not supported by, and is contrary
to the law and the evidence." ( Tr. 594) .
That instruction is bad and erroneous for several
reasons.
In the first place, it could have so misled and confused the jury that they might well have thought that
the easy way out was merely to find the whole affair
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was an accident and thereby avoid the responsibility
of fixing the fault and going through the job of assessing
damages if they found the defendants to be responsible.
There was no intimation on the part of any of the
parties in either of the cases that what happened was
an accident or could be explained on the ground that
it was an accident. The only vvay such a theory could
have been applicable would have been to ignore all the
evidence except that a fire and explosion occurred on
the Dastrup premises.
The plaintiffs' witnesses testified as to the leaving
of the running gasoline unattended; that gasoline overflowed where it could go down into the storage vault
and where it ran out onto the hot paven1ent on an August
day; that under such circumstances it "\Vas inevitable
that an explosive medium of gas, vapor and air would
be formed; that there were numerous ways in which
surface sparks could have been created; that the compression engine did not go into operation at any ti1ne
near the time of the occurrence of the explosion; that no
fire extinguisher was carried on the truck; that there
was no static chain on the truck to ground the electricity
and that the plaintiffs' suffered thousands of dollars
worth of damage.
On the other hand the defendants directed their
whole case to the proposition that Dastrups were negligent in maintaining their storage tanks and that the
fire and explosion resulted from the negligence of the
Dastrups.
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It is hard to understand \vhy the trial Judge \Vould
instruct the jury th~t they n1ight find \vhat happened
here \Yas an accident.
In the case of f.t., ola n vs. Haskett (Arkansas), 53
Soutlnvestern 2nd 996, leaving gasoline flowing from a
truck unattended was held to be negligence.
In Ou,ens vs. JI oberly Oil Compa.ny (l\1:issouri), 245
Southwestern 369, a handler of g-asoline was held to be
negligent by permitting the gasoline to fall ten inches
through the air into a funnel.
In the case of Standard Oil Company vs. R. I.
Pitcher, 289 Federal 678, they held that the failure to
carry chains to discharge static electricity was negligent.
Other cases bearing on the question are :
Scott Wilson and Son vs. Blaustien, 124 Atl. 886;
Ta.te vs. Clauseen-Lawrence Company, 167 Southeaste1·n
826; Leahy vs. Stoddard Oil Company, 107 N oi·theastern
458; J. J.Mayou vs. Consumers Oil Company (Wyoming),
14() Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243. S·ee also note 151
A.L.R. 1243 beginning at page· 1261.
In the J. J. Mayo~t Mfg. case, the court held that,
"The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of the
jury that a seller's servant was guilty of negligence in
delivering oil into the buyer's fuel tank causing the tank
to overflow and setting fire to the buyer's plant, where
it is shown that the servant, after he had started to pun1p
the oil into the tank, left and went into the building to
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have the bill of lading receipted, although he did not
know how much oil he had in the truck and had been
warned not to overflow the fuel tank."
The J. J. Mayou case is particularly applicable to
the instant cases.
It was, therefore, gross error to instruct on the
theory of unavoidable accident.
POINT NO. VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19.

In giving Instruction Number 19 the court charged
the jury that even though they found that the defendants did negligently spill gasoline as claimed, that the
plaintiffs couldn't recover unless the jury should further
find that the spilled gasoline was ignited through some
further act of negligence on the part of the defendants
or from natural causes (Tr. 763).
That instruction was excepted to on the grounds
that it was not supported by and was contrary to the
law and the evidence and that it was misleading and
could only serve to confuse the jury (Tr. 595).
That instruction is clearly a mis-staten1ent and undoubtedly could have had the effect of misleading and
confusing the jury.
The law requires that a person handling gasoline
in the manner in which the defendants undertook to
deliver that dangerous substance to the Dastrup premises must anticipate the probable results of his negligent acts.
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In the case of Sta:fl-dard Oil Conlpany vs. Evans, 122
Southern 735, \Yhere an attendant started gasoline running into an automobile tank, then left the hose unattended so that gas spilled over and out of the intake, the
court held that gasoline is a very dangerous agency and
highly con1bustible and that to permit it to overflow
is undoubtedly negligent. \\Thether such negligence is the
proximate cause of injuries which result depends upon
whether the party \vho committed the negligent act
should reasonably forsee what might result from the
original negligence. The court held that a person handling gasoline is charged with the knowledge that the substance is highly inflammable and might be lighted in
var1ous ways.
In Lore~rde vs. Consumers Petroleum Company (Illinois), 63 Northeastern 2nd 673, the court held that:
"A person contributing to a tort, vvhether his
fellow contributors are men, nature or other
forces, or things, is responsible for the \vhole, the
same as though he had done all without help."
The real Eleasure of the negligence of the defendants is not as set forth in the court's instruction No. 19,
but as to whether the defendants having spilled gasoline
should have forseen the probable consequences of releasing gasoline onto hot pavement on a clear August day
under the circumstances testified to in this case.
It was, therefore, erroneous to instruct the jury that
the chain of causation was broken after the negligent
act of spilling gasoline, unless an additional act of negli35
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gence on the part of the same negligent person ignited
the inflammable and explosive substance resulting from
the spilled gas and vapor uniting with air.
In the case of Lea.hy vs. Standard Oil Company
(Mass.), 107 Northeastern 458, one who delivered gas
and permitted it to overflow was held liable for damages
which resulted several weeks later when the gasoline
which had been negligently released was ignited by the
person to whom it had been delivered when he had no
knowledge that defendant had perrnitted gasoline to
escape.
The instruction was loaded with misleading and
confusing implications, and was not a true statement
of the law applicable to the case.
POINT NO. VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NO. 22.

In Instruction No. 22 the court told the jury that if
any person other than the defendants was negligent
and such negligence was the proximate cause of the fire
and explosion complained of then a. verdict could not
be found in favor of the plaintiffs, unless it was also
found that the defendants were guilty of negligence
and their negligence combined with that of some third
person to produce the damage complained.of (Tr. 764).
This instruction was excepted to on the grounds that
it was not supported by the law and the evidence (Tr.
603).
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There isn •t a particle of evidence in the entire record
to indicate that the regligence of nny third person could
have entere-d into the picture. This instruction had to
be drawn out of the air. Neither party produced any
evidence whatever that any act on the part of any third
person could have constituted negligence- which was the
proximate cause of the injuries con1plained of.
But even if a third person were involved the instruction \vas still erroneous. In the case of Loverde vs. Consulners Petrolettm Company, 63 Northeastern 2nd 673,
the court held that:
"A person contributing to a tort, whether his
fellow contributors are men, nature, or other
forces, or things, is responsible for the whole
the same as though he had done all without help."
POINT NO. IX.
AS TO THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY IN CASE NO. 7734, THE
COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 23
DIRECTING THE JURY TO FIND THE ISSUES AGAINST
THE SAID PLAINTIFF IF IT FOUND THAT DEAN COX,
DRIVER OF THE MOON LAKE TRUCK, WAS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE .
..

There is no evidence whatever in the record that
Dean Cox, driver of the truck covered by the insurance
policy of the plaintiff Insurance Company, was guilty
of any negligence whatsoever. It wasn't even hinted in
the testimony at any point that Cox knew anything about
the manner in which the Dastrup tank and compressor
were installed. It is clear, therefore, that if there was
any negligence on the part of the Dastrups that such
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negligence could not be imputed to Mr. Cox. If, therefore, the defendants were entitled to rely upon contributory negligence as a defense against the plaintiff Employers Liability Insurance Company, such defense had
to be based upon some act of negligence on the part of
Mr. Cox himself. Of course, inasmuch as Mr. Cox was
the agent of the company owning the truck, any negligence on his part, had any such negligence been shown,
would have been attributable to his en1ployer and to the
plaintiff Insurance Company. That there is no such
record of negligence found in the evidence presented
at the trial is clear from the court's own observations
given in his memorandum denying the Inotion of the
Insurance Company for a new trial. In that Inemorandum the court made these observations:
"If timely request had been made by the
plaintiff Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Company for an instruction taking from the jury
the question of negligence on the part of the
driver of the insured's trucks, there is little
doubt that it would, or at least that it should
have been given. There is only one circumstance
which even hints of negligence on the part of the
driver Cox, and that is he attempted to fill his
own gasoline tank without waiting for the attendant, but the court is satisfied that there is no
implication of negligence from such a circun1stance." ( Tr. 802).
In making these comments the court appears to
have entirely overlooked his instruction No. 23 'vhich
reads as follows:
"Instruction No. 23-Y ou are instructed as to
the con1plaint of the plaintiff Employers Mutual
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Liability Insurance Co1npany of "\vTisconsin, if
you find that Dean Cox, driver of the truck
belonging to Moon Lake Electric Association,
was negligent in any respect and such negligence
proximately contributed to the explosion and fire
and said plaintiffs' damage, then the plaintiff
Employers l\iutual Insurance Company of Wisconsin cannot recover." (Tr. 764).
The court also failed to consider the exception taken
to Instruction No. 23 by plaintiff Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Company before the instructions
were given to the jury, which exception reads as follows:
"Objects to the court giving instruction No.
23, and the whole thereof, on the grounds and for
the reason that the instruction is not supported
by the law and the evidence, and particularly
that there is no evidence of negligence on the part
of Dean Cox upon ·which the jury could base
liability or negligence." ( Tr. 603).
It is obvious that the court in his ruling denying
a new trial completely ignored this instruction and the
specific exception taken thereto. In his memorandum
denying the plaintiffs' motion for new trial the trial
Judge further said :
"Where contributory negligence was pleaded
in both causes in almost identical language, and
especially, where by stipulation of the parties,
both causes were tried together, it could not be
consistently said that the court moves entirely
at its peril. Certainly some duty rests upon the
parties to assist the court, through their respective counsel, to avoid error. In this case, counsel
for the liability company stated both plaintiffs'
objections and exceptions. In several instances
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he objected to proposed instructions referring
to contributory negligence citing as his basis
that they were not in accord with the law or the
facts, but he made the objection generally and
never once intimated that his basis was for his
separate pla.intijf, or that there was no evidence
in the record tending to prove Cox's negligence."
(Tr. 803).
The court in his memorandum then moves on to deal
with generalities and makes a comment not supported
by the record when he says :
"Either the plaintiffs were, at the time of
stating their objections and entering their exceptions, as oblivious to the state of the record as
to this point, as he Court, or they deliberately
sought to build error to their. advantage. Of
course, this court is certain that the latter was
not the case. It nevertheless is patent from the
record that the court's attention was not called
to the situation now urged; it had no opportunity
to correct its instructions to save the error; the
plaintiffs failed to perform their duty to assist
the Court, and they may not now claim the right
of a new trial upon an error which they failed
to recognize in time, or failed to call to the
Court's attention in time to avoid." (Tr. 803804).
The foregoing comment we again repeat was made
by the court because he failed to consider, or overlooked,
his instruction Number 23 giving the jury specific instructions as to the contributory negligence of Dean Cox,
and paid no attention to the record made by counsel for
the plaintiffs when they specifically objected to Instruc-
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tion No. ~3 on the ground .. that there is no ev,idence of
negligence on the part of Dean Cox, upon which the
jztry could base liabili.ty or negligence."
The question of the negligence of Dean Cox vvas
also saved by the plaintiffs' requested Instruction N uinber 1 for a directed verdict.
Under the provisions of Rule 50 (b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, when a request for a directed verdict
was made, the trial court had the right to re-consider
the whole matter relating to the alleged contributory
negligence of Cox on the motion !or new trial.
It was clearly error on the court's part, according
to his own admissions, to submit the question of contributory negligence in the Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance case where there is no evidence in the· record
from which the jury could have found negligence on the
part of Cox, the agent of the insured Electric Company.
"A plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence only insofar as he, or some person for
whose conduct he is resp·onsible, is at fault."
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 181 page 858.
Surely it requires no citation of authorities to support the proposition that where there is no evidence
of contributory negligence as against the plaintiff, as
the trial court concedes in its memorandum denying the
motion of the Insurance Company for new trial, it is
error to charge the jury that it may find the plaintiff
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guilty of contributory negligence as the court instructed
the trial jury in Instruction Number 23 in the Employers
Liability case as distinguished from the Dastrup case.
See 45 C.J. p. 1171, § 755; also 45 C.J. p. 1152, § 741.
POINT NO. X.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING TI-IE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYERS
LIABILITY COMPANY.

This proposition has been discussed rather extensively under several points. In discussing the error
committed by the court in giving its Instruction Nmnber
23 charging the jury that if they found Dean Cox guilty
of any contributory negligence that the Insurance c·ompany could not recover, we pointed out that the court
in his memorandum denying the plaintiffs' motion for
new trial conceded that Dean Cox was not guilty of contributory negligence, and gave as his only reason for
denying the motion for new trial that counsel for the
plaintiff Insurance Company had not directed the court's
attention to the fact that the record was devoid of any
evidence of contributory negligence on Mr. Cox's part at
the time the instructions were given. In our argument
under point No. IX. we have pointed out specifically that
Instruction Number 23, relating solely to a charge that
if the jury found Dean Cox was guilty of contributory
negligence, the insurance company could not recover,
was erroneous, and that specific exception was taken
to the instruction by counsel for the plaintiff on the
ground that there was no evidence whatever in the
record of negligence on the part of Dean Cox.
42
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court should have granted a ne'v trial for the
reasons set forth under the other points discussed in this
brief, and it was> therefore, obvious error on the court's
part to deny the motion for new trial made by the plaintiff Insurance Company. The plaintiff in its motion
for new trial claimed that error in law occurred at the
..
trial. The trial court really ha.s confessed ~hat he di<f
commit such error in submitting to the jury instruction
No. 23.
-

-

-

.

-

~

.

POINT NO. XI.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF
THE PLAINTIFFS DASTRUP FOR NEW TRJAL.

This proposition has
ot:h.er point~
W~

~lso

been discussed under the
pr~~en~~d in t:q.is br:l.et.

ag~ill

direct special attent~on to the failure
and refus~l of the court to admit the testimony of 0. C.
Allen, president of the defendant, Allen Oil Company,
to the effect that he knew on and before August 23, 1946,
the date of the fire and explo.sion, just how the storage
tanks and other facilities were installed and maintained
on the Dastrup premises, and notwithstanding that fact
made the delivery of gasoline in question.
We also direct attention again to the failure of the
trial court to give plaintiffs' requested Instructions No.
6 and 7, which under the J. J. Mayou Mfg. Co. case (146
Pac. 2nd 738, 151 A.L.R. 1243) was a proper statement
of the law and gave a theory of the case which the
plaintiffs were entitled to have presented to the jury.
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Attention should also be called to the discussion
relating to the giving of Instructions No. 13, 14, 16 and
the other instructions excepted to and discussed in other
portions of this brief.
We have a firm conviction that the jury was not
properly instructed in either of the cases; that many
of the court's rulings were erroneous and that the plaintiffs in each case were and are definitely entitled to a
new trial.
CONCLUSIONS
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
the trial of the case and in instructing the jury, and in
his denial of the motions of the plaintiffs for new trials
for the reasons hereinbefore stated, and that the verdict
and judgment entered by the. lower court should be
reversed and set aside and the court directed to grant
to the plaintiffs new trials.
Respectfully submitted,
WILSON A~D WILSON,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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